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ANALYTICAL NIGHTMARE: THE MATERIALLY 
ADVERSE ACTION REQUIREMENT IN DISPARATE 
TREATMENT CASES 
Esperanza N. Sanchez 
In his greatest written work,1 “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr. argued that two types of laws existed—those that are just and 
those that are unjust.2  Quoting Saint Augustine, he added that “an unjust law is 
no law at all,” describing an unjust law as any code that is “out of harmony with 
the moral law.”3  He denounced all segregation statutes because such laws 
“distorted the soul and damaged the personality,” explaining that any law which 
degrades human personality is unjust.4 
Dr. King wrote this letter in response to a statement issued in the Birmingham 
News by eight white clergymen criticizing the massive desegregation campaign 
led by Dr. King in the spring of 1963.5  The desegregation campaign, which later 
became known as the Birmingham Campaign of 1963,6 is credited as the catalyst 
for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Civil Rights Act)7 —one of the most important 
pieces of legislation enacted in the twentieth century.8  The Birmingham 
Campaign, which faced opposition from well beyond the eight clergymen,9 was 
                                                 
 J.D. 2018, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.  The author would 
like to thank her mentors Eden Brown Gaines and Nicole C. Dillard for their invaluable guidance 
and support throughout this process.  The author is also grateful to her colleagues at the Catholic 
University Law Review for their assistance in preparing this Note for publication. 
 1. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events 
Leading to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 662–63 (1995) 
(“That essay, the Letter from Birmingham Jail, is widely regarded as Dr. King’s greatest written 
work, and the most important statement of principles of the civil rights era.”). 
 2. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, reprinted in 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
835, 840 (1993). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. White Clergymen Urge Local Negroes to Withdraw from Demonstrations, BIRMINGHAM 
NEWS, Apr. 13, 1963, at 2. 
 6. Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 654. 
 7. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job 
Opportunities - June 19, 1963, 1963 Pub. Papers 483, 483 (1963) (“[T]he events in Birmingham 
and elsewhere have so increased the cries for equality that no city or State or legislative body can 
prudently choose to ignore them.”). 
 8. Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 645. 
 9. See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 
1954–63 (1988).  The Birmingham Campaign began on April 3, 1963, as a campaign against local 
businesses, where small groups of protesters would stage sit-ins at local lunch counters and dress 
shops, but support for the movement was dismal.  Local African-American-run media outlets 
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a massive, non-violent civil disobedience campaign led by Dr. King to oppose 
the immorality of segregation laws in the American South.10  Dr. King believed 
that only by personally confronting segregation—at the expense of his own 
safety and liberty—could the world be forced to behold its immorality and 
change its laws and customs of inequality.11 
In the wake of the Birmingham Campaign, President Kennedy sent a message 
to Congress urging legislative action to address the “growing moral crisis in 
American race relations.”12  This moral call to action led to the longest debate 
in the Senate’s history to that point, testing the legislators’ attitudes of justice 
and equality.13  Despite considerable Republican opposition,14 Congress 
eventually passed the Civil Rights Act on July 2, 1964, and President Lyndon B. 
Johnson signed into law two days later.15 
                                                 
treated the campaign as a “disturbing rumor and provided no firsthand coverage of the 
demonstrations,” while local white publications regarded both the segregationists and Dr. King as 
“blemishes on the civic reform movement.”  Id. at 710. 
 10. In the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the landmark decision 
that prohibited segregation in public schools, a new civil rights leadership emerged due to the 
narrow scope and painfully slow enforcement of the court-ordered desegregation.  This new 
leadership, which included Dr. King, consisted of preachers who were “more militant and less 
dependent on the middle class” than the leading mainstream black civil rights organization, the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and who believed that the 
path to equality could only be paved by non-violent confrontation rather than lobbying and 
litigation.  Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 647–48. 
 11. The integration process “prescribed by Brown” failed to materialize in any meaningful 
way due to violent resistance by southern segregationists.  See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY 
WE CAN’T WAIT 5–7 (1964) (“Yet the statistics make it abundantly clear that the segregationists 
of the South remained undefeated by the decision.”).  After almost a decade of waiting for progress, 
Dr. King and other leaders of the civil rights movement decided that the time for direct action had 
come and chose Birmingham, which was regarded as having the “most implacable segregationists 
in the country,” as the stage for a massive, non-violent civil disobedience campaign that would 
confront the realities of segregation in the South.  Id. at 37–59; accord Oppenheimer, supra note 2, 
at 659 (“The rigid segregation of Birmingham was held together by both the power of segregation 
laws and the power of racist violence . . . .  During the period between 1957 and 1962 there were 
between sixteen to twenty reported bombings in Birmingham of black churches and civil rights 
leaders’ homes.”). 
 12. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 483 (“[T]he events in Birmingham and elsewhere have so 
increased the cries for equality that no city or State or legislative body can prudently choose to 
ignore them.”).  He called on Congress to enact comprehensive civil rights law that would provide 
“the most responsible, reasonable, and urgently needed” solutions to the civil unrest.  Id. at 484.  
He implored, “Justice requires us to insure the blessings of liberty for all Americans and their 
posterity—not merely for reasons of economic efficiency, world diplomacy, and domestic 
tranquility—but, above all, because it is right.”  Id. at 494. 
 13. See Marjorie Hunter, History of Bill: A Year of Words, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 1964), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1964/06/20/history-of-bill-a-year-of-words.html; see also 110 CONG. 
REC. 14,443, 14,443 (1964) (statement of Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey). 
 14. Llewellyn E. Thompson II, The Civil Rights Act of 1964: Present at Its Birth, 29 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 681, 681–82 (1995). 
 15. Thompson, supra note 15, at 690. 
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One of the most controversial provisions of the Civil Rights Act was the fair 
employment provision known as Title VII.16  Opponents argued that Title VII 
was an unconstitutional extension of federal regulatory authority in the private 
enterprise of employment.17  Those in favor of Title VII rejected any claims of 
unconstitutionality, calling to the Chamber’s attention the purpose and urgent 
need for such legislation.18  Addressing the divide, one senator proclaimed: 
“Two centuries ago, we initiated an experiment in popular freedom.  A century 
ago, we emphasized that we meant it to be freedom for everyone, but the 
realization has been retarded.”19 
In the years following the Civil War and Reconstruction, African Americans 
were routinely denied access to employment, and when they did work, they were 
unabashedly underpaid.20  The subsequent Jim Crow Era perpetuated this pattern 
of employment discrimination as a form of government-sanctioned racial 
oppression.21  “These segregation statutes thrived in the South for almost a 
century, . . .” immorally excluding African Americans and other minority groups 
from equal opportunity in all aspects of life, including employment.22  Congress 
prescribed Title VII to cure the evils that stemmed from decades of oppression 
perpetuated by unjust segregation statutes.23 
However, employment discrimination continues, despite the enactment of 
Title VII, but often in subtler forms.24 Federal courts have struggled to—and in 
some instances refused to—adapt to increasingly covert forms of 
discrimination.25  Over the last fifty years, lower federal courts have interpreted 
                                                 
 16. Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e). 
 17. 110 CONG. REC. 14,318, 14,319 (1964) (statement of Sen. Barry M. Goldwater); see also 
110 CONG. REC. 14,318, 14,318 (1964) (statement of Sen. John J. Sparkman); 110 CONG. REC. 
14,507, 14,507 (1964) (statement of Sen. James Strom Thurmond). 
 18. 110 CONG. REC. 14,448, 14,449 (1964) (statement of Sen. Paul Douglas) (“This bill is a 
work of love, not hate; a measure to help people surmount prejudice and not to marshal the law 
behind prejudice.  It is a measure to furnish a standard beyond which individuals can go but below 
which they cannot fall.”). 
 19. 110 CONG. REC. 14,276, 14,276 (1964) (statement of Sen. John Pastore). 
 20. ROY L. BROOKS ET AL., THE LAW OF DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND PERSPECTIVES 431 
(2011). 
 21. Today, job segregation and pay differential remain as the “dominant form[s] of 
employment discrimination for all minorities.”  Id. 
 22. See David Pilgrim, What Was Jim Crow, JIM CROW MUSEUM (2012), 
http://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/what.htm. 
 23. See 110 CONG. REC. 14,443, 14,443 (1964) (statement of Sen. Jack Javits) (“[F]or the 
first time in recent history the Congress of the United States will say in clear and unmistakable 
terms: ‘There is no room for second-class citizenship in our country.’ Let no one doubt the historical 
significance of this ringing affirmation which we now deliver to the Nation and to the World.”). 
 24. See BROOKS, supra note 21, at 431 (“No longer does one encounter signs in store windows 
that read ‘Latinos need not apply’ or company rules that outright bar African American employees 
from being promoted.  Employment discrimination today is far more complex.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of “Adverse Employment 
Action” in Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation Claims: What 
Should Be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 623, 624 (2003) (“Unfortunately, when 
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the statutory language of Title VII so narrowly that legislative intervention has 
been warranted on multiple occasions.26  To illustrate the cyclical struggle 
between the legislature and the judiciary, one need look no further than the 
evolution of the disparate treatment theory.27 
Under Title VII, an employer is barred from discriminating against an 
individual based on that individuals “race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”28  Courts interpret this language as requiring a plaintiff prove two things: 
(1) the employer had an impermissible motive to discriminate; and (2) the 
employer took some adverse employment action against him.29  Although the 
“adverse employment action” requirement is not found in the statutory language, 
courts have imported this requirement into Title VII jurisprudence, without 
clearly defining which employment actions qualify as “adverse.”30  This lack of 
clarity has resulted in analytical confusion, yielding anemic anti-discrimination 
protections that, in effect, shelter invidious employment practices from 
liability.31  Yet, such an untenable result squarely contradicts both the letter and 
spirit of Title VII. 
In the D.C. Circuit, for example, the employment discrimination plaintiff must 
show that the challenged action was “materially adverse” to his employment.32  
Actions leading to termination, diminution in pay, or demotion from supervisory 
roles present glaring examples of material adversity.  However, the law is not as 
clear in actions involving more subtle changes in employment, such as the denial 
of a lateral transfer. 
This Note explores the current analytical confusion generated by the adverse 
employment action requirement in disparate treatment cases.  Part I establishes 
the foundation for this discussion by first outlining the operative statutory 
language.  The discussion then identifies the two judicially imported 
                                                 
discrimination takes on more subtle, less tangible forms, courts have faltered in enforcing Title 
VII’s goal of achieving equal employment opportunity.”). 
 26. See Henry L. Chambers, Reading Amendments and Expansions of Title VII Narrowly, 95 
B.U. L. REV. 781, 783–84 (2015); see also Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the 
Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 511, 514–15 (2009) (discussing how federal courts continue to use precedents that 
amendments to Title VII are meant to address). 
 27. Title VII § 703(a) outlines two types of unlawful employment practices, with each one 
requiring distinct burdens, but this Note will focus on the disparate treatment theory governed by 
section 703(a)(1) as opposed to the disparate impact theory of section 703(a)(2). Pub. L. 88-352, 
78 Stat. 255 (1964) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2).  For an in-depth discussion of 
the modern disparate impact theory, see Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious but Race-Neutral: The 
Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA. L. REV. 653 (2014). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 29. See infra Section I.B. 
 30. See infra Section I.B.2. 
 31. See Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 109 (2012) (“Changes in 
substantive discrimination law since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were tantamount 
to a virtual repeal.  This was not so because of Congress; it was because of judges.”). 
 32. Dudley v. Wash. Metro Area Transit Auth., 924 F. Supp. 2d. 141, 153 (D.D.C. 2013). 
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components for a disparate treatment claim, followed by an examination of some 
factors that have led to the analytical inconsistencies surrounding the adverse 
employment action requirement in lower federal courts.  Part II analyzes a 
curious case out of the District of Columbia Circuit, to illustrate how anti-
discrimination jurisprudence has created an analytical nightmare for jurists.  Part 
III explains how, far too often, the confusion has resulted in a court-sanctioned 
barrier to the Civil Rights Act’s promise of equal opportunity. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION 
A. The Word and Spirit of Title VII 
Both the Supreme Court and the circuit courts have recognized Title VII’s 
goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace.33  Yet, employment 
discrimination decisions by the federal courts have created a body of law that 
patently contradicts Title VII’s aim of equal employment opportunity.34  To 
explore such a development, one must first examine the substantive prohibitions 
outlined in the statutory language. 
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII renders an employment practice unlawful if an 
employer “discriminate[s] against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”35  Section 703(a)(2) 
renders an employment practice unlawful if an employer “limit[s], segregate[s], 
or classif[ies] his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
                                                 
 33. See e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 342 (2013) (“Title VII is 
central to the federal policy of prohibiting wrongful discrimination in the Nation’s workplaces and 
in all sectors of economic endeavor.”); McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 
358 (1995) (positing that the ADEA and Title VII share the “common purpose [of] eliminati[ng] 
discrimination in the workplace”); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984) (“The dominant 
purpose of [Title VII], of course, is to root out discrimination in employment.”); Kremer v. Chem. 
Constr. Corp., 546 U.S. 461, 468 (1982) (“Congress enacted Title VII to assure equality of 
employment opportunities without distinction with respect to race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (“[I]t is abundantly clear 
that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and 
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the 
basis of racial or other impermissible classification.”). 
 34. See Marcia L. McCormick, Let’s Pretend that Federal Courts Aren’t Hostile to 
Discrimination Claims, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 22, 28–29 (2015) (criticizing federal 
courts for, among other things, downplaying the importance of evidence such as blatantly racist 
and sexist speech that a reasonable jury would think is indicative of employment discrimination); 
see generally Henry L. Chambers, The Supreme Court Chipping Away at Title VII: Strengthening 
It or Killing It?, 74 LA. L. REV. 1161 (2014); Widiss, supra note 27, at 514–15; Levinson, supra 
note 26, at 623–24; accord Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 
1121 (1998) (criticizing federal courts for permitting employers to commit “benign” discrimination 
against employees in contradiction of the spirit of Title VII). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
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status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”36  Although, Title VII’s unequivocal prohibition of workplace 
discrimination based on protected characteristics is clear from the plain language 
of the statute, determining what constitutes discrimination is left to the courts.37 
Two theories of discrimination exist under Title VII: disparate treatment and 
disparate impact.38  Disparate treatment, which constitutes the focus of this Note, 
is the most easily understood type of discrimination—the employer intentionally 
“treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”39  Disparate impact cases involve “facially 
neutral policies or practices, which, in operation, affect one group more harshly 
than another without the justification of a business necessity.”40  Ultimately, the 
distinguishing factor between the two theories of discrimination is the presence 
of intent.41 
B. Disparate Treatment Theory 
The compelling interest in extinguishing invidious employment practices 
aimed at racial minorities guided early judicial interpretations of Title VII, 
resulting in a broad reading of the statutory language.42  In the half century since 
its passage, however, federal courts have moved toward an increasingly narrow 
reading of the statutory language, thereby imposing heavier burdens on 
aggrieved plaintiffs to weed out cases.43  Thus, this discussion turns to a brief 
overview of the evolution of the modern disparate treatment theory in federal 
courts. 
                                                 
 36. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
 37. See id. § 2000e. 
 38. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See White, supra note 34, at 1131–32. 
 42. See e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (“We must be acutely 
conscious of the fact that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should be accorded a liberal 
interpretation in order to effectuate the purpose of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, 
unfairness, and humiliation of ethnic discrimination.”); Roberts v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 
1055, 1056 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (“[G]reat perspicacity is not required to realize that the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 negates an employer’s right to discriminate, classify, or otherwise make rules which 
are based upon race, religion, sex or national origin.” (emphasis added)). 
 43. See, e.g., Nichols v. S. Ill. Univ.-Edwardsville, 510 F. Supp. 772, 779 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(requiring a “materially adverse employment action” to assert a disparate treatment claim to prevent 
‘minor and even trivial employment actions’ from becoming the basis of such claims) (citations 
omitted); Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[N]ot all abusive behavior, 
even when it is motivated by discriminatory animus, is actionable.”).  Although the need for a 
sustainability threshold is reasonable, critics have pointed out that any standard that permits 
discrimination violates both the word and spirit of Title VII, arguing that questions regarding the 
magnitude of the discrimination should “be addressed at the remedial stage” rather than foreclosing 
claims altogether.  See White, supra note 34, at 1163–64, accord Levinson, supra note 26, at 636. 
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Disparate treatment discrimination may involve a single employee (individual 
disparate treatment) or affect numerous employees concurrently (systemic 
disparate treatment).44  The scope of this Note will center on individual disparate 
treatment, exploring what a plaintiff must show to prove an employer violated 
Section 703(a)(1).45  Because “simply treat[ing] some people less favorably than 
others” on the basis of a protected characteristic will render an employer’s 
actions unlawful, disparate treatment claims under Section 703(a)(1) require two 
components: (1) an impermissible motivation and (2) less favorable treatment.46 
1. Discriminatory Intent: Showing the Impermissible Motivation 
The Supreme Court’s first articulated legal standard for disparate treatment 
cases emerged nine years after the passage of Title VII in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green.47  Due to the inherent challenges of showing discriminatory 
intent,48 the Court took a process-of-elimination approach to proving 
discrimination and laid out a three-step analysis that would eliminate “the most 
common nondiscriminatory reasons” for the challenged conduct.49 
First, the plaintiff must show a prima facie case of discrimination by creating 
an inference of an employer’s discriminatory motive.50  The inference of 
discrimination arises out of the presumption that the challenged conduct, if 
otherwise unexplained, is “more likely than not based on the consideration of 
impermissible factors.”51  Once the plaintiff makes the prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to “clearly set forth, through the introduction of 
admissible evidence, the [legitimate, nondiscriminatory] reasons for the 
plaintiff’s rejection.”52  If the defendant carries its burden, “[t]he plaintiff must 
be given the opportunity to introduce evidence that the proffered justification is 
merely a pretext for discrimination.”53 
                                                 
 44. See BROOKS, supra note 21, at 481. 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 46. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003). 
 47. 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973) (involving a black civil rights activist who filed suit against 
his former employer, alleging racial discrimination when his employer rejected his application for 
rehire). 
 48. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981) (“In a Title VII 
case, the allocation of burdens and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima 
facie case is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of 
intentional discrimination.”). 
 49. Id. at 252–54. 
 50. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  The Court later fleshed out the McDonnell Douglas 
four-prong prima facie test for employment discrimination cases by requiring only that a plaintiff 
create an inference of an employer’s discriminatory motive.  See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977) (explaining that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie standard 
demands that a plaintiff “create an inference that the [employer’s] decision was a discriminatory 
one”). 
 51. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). 
 52. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 (explaining the McDonnell Douglas paradigm). 
 53. See Furnco Constr. Corp., 438 U.S. at 578. 
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The Court refined the McDonnell Douglas paradigm in Texas Department of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine.  Because the ultimate burden of persuasion 
“remains with the plaintiff at all times,” the Burdine Court held that the 
defendant only bears a burden of production in proffering a nondiscriminatory 
reason for the challenged conduct.54  Burdine reinforced the principle that, at the 
preliminary stages of a disparate treatment claim, the defendant’s burden is far 
lower than the plaintiff’s burden.  Moreover, once the defendant produced a 
nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the burden returned to the plaintiff to 
show pretext.55 
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Powell added that, once a 
discrimination claim reached the pretext phase of the analysis, a plaintiff may 
demonstrate pretext by discrediting the employer’s proffered explanation.56  
Consequently, in the wake of Burdine, many lower federal courts interpreted the 
plaintiff’s burden of persuasion as satisfied if the plaintiff disproved the 
defendant’s proffered explanation.57  For these courts, the plaintiff proved her 
case as a matter of law whenever she simply disproved the employer’s proffered 
justifications for the challenged action.58 
However, the Court rejected this view in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks.59  
In an ardent opinion by Justice Scalia, Hicks held that merely discrediting the 
employer’s reason as pretext fails to satisfy the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of 
persuasion; thus, the plaintiff must show “both that the reason was false, and 
that discrimination was the real reason.”60  Hicks stood for the proposition that, 
coupled with the prima facie case, proof of pretext allowed the factfinder to draw 
the inference that the employer’s conduct was motivated by some impermissible 
factor, but did not necessarily prove “a pretext for discrimination.”61 
Subsequently, lower federal courts read the Hicks decision as requiring a 
“pretext-plus” rule, where the plaintiff must produce evidence to make the prima 
facie case plus provide additional, independent evidence of discrimination.62  As 
                                                 
 54. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (reversing the Fifth Circuit decision for applying a burden of 
persuasion—rather than a burden of production—in their McDonnell Douglas analysis). 
 55. Id. at 255–56. 
 56. Id. at 256 (“She may succeed in this either directly or by persuading the court that a 
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the 
employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–05 (1973)). 
 57. See, e.g., Williams v. Valentec Kisco, Inc., 964 F.2d 723, 728 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(“Nonetheless, Burdine clearly does not support a pretext-plus approach.  We reject Valentec 
Kisco’s contention that Williams had to both discredit its stated reason for firing him and prove 
that age was a determining factor in Valentec Kisco’s decision.”). 
 58. Id. at 728–29. 
 59. 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993). 
 60. Id. at 515. 
 61. Id. at 515–16 (emphasis added). 
 62. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 692 (1999). 
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a result, many disparate treatment plaintiffs could not survive summary 
judgment under the Hicks’ pretext-plus rule.63 
The Supreme Court, however, flatly rejected the pretext-plus standard in 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products.64  In applying the Title VII burden-
shifting paradigm to an Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA) claim, 
Justice O’Connor relied on the analysis in Hicks to reiterate that circumstantial 
evidence arising from the prima facie case and paired with the factfinder’s 
disbelief of the employer’s proffered reason permits a finding of impermissible 
discrimination.65  In effect, Reeves emphasized the probative value of 
circumstantial evidence at the pre-trial stage and highlighted possible inferences 
that could be drawn from it.66  In other words, when questions of intent rely 
almost exclusively on circumstantial evidence, reasonable minds could differ as 
to the weight of the evidence.  These cases, therefore, warrant a trial, where the 
merits of the case can be litigated. 
2. Less Favorable Treatment: The Adverse Employment Action 
Courts have imported the requirement of an adverse employment action into 
the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” language of Section 
703(a)(1).67  Early on, in Hishon v. King and Spalding, the Supreme Court 
recognized the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” clause as an 
expansive concept, encompassing any benefits that result from an employment 
relationship.68  The Court elaborated that those benefits, which comprise the 
“incidents of employment,” could not be “afforded in any manner contrary to 
Title VII.”69  Just two years later, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the 
Court rejected the notion that Title VII was limited to “economic” or “tangible” 
discrimination.70  Rather, the Court opined that “[t]he phrase ‘terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the 
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment.’”71 
But, by the late 1980s, lower federal courts began referring to actions that alter 
the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” as “adverse employment 
                                                 
 63. See Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 331 (2010). 
 64. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146 (“In so reasoning, the Court of Appeals misconceived the 
evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs who attempt to prove intentional discrimination through 
indirect evidence.”). 
 65. Id. at 146–47. 
 66. See Martin, supra note 63, at 331–33. 
 67. See Ernest F. Lidge III, The Meaning of Discrimination: Why Courts Have Erred in 
Requiring Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs to Prove that the Employer’s Action Was 
Materially Adverse or Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 333, 347 (1999). 
 68. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75 (1984) (“A benefit that is part and parcel of 
the employment relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer 
would be free under the employment contract simply not to provide the benefit at all.”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
 71. Id. 
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actions,” and this term of art evolved into a judicially constructed substantive 
requirement despite its absence from the statutory language.72  Today, the 
plaintiff alleging disparate treatment must show not only that her employer 
altered the “terms, conditions, or privileges of [her] employment” based on some 
protected characteristic, but also that such a change resulted in a sufficiently 
adverse consequence.73 
Although every jurisdiction requires an adverse employment action to seek a 
remedy under Section 703(a)(1), the circuits are split as to what degree of 
adversity is sufficient to make an employment action justiciable.74  The D.C. 
Circuit, for example, requires a “materially adverse” standard,75 while the Fifth 
Circuit requires that the employment action be “ultimate” in nature.76  In seeking 
to determine which employment actions are actionable, the lower federal courts 
have aggressively narrowed the scope of the “terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment” provision.77  As a result, an inconsistent and confusing disparate-
treatment jurisprudence emerged.78 
Today, the lower federal courts continue to parse the jurisdiction-specific 
standards for adverse employment actions, thereby imposing increasingly higher 
burdens on disparate-treatment plaintiffs.79  Regardless of whether the 
employment action need be “ultimate” in nature or “materially adverse,” these 
                                                 
 72. See Lidge, supra note 67, at 346–47; see, e.g.,Green v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 
284 F.3d 642, 657 (5th Cir. 2002) (requiring an ultimate employment action); Brown v. Brody, 199 
F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (requiring a “materially adverse” employment action). 
 73. See, e.g., Abuan v. Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. 353 F.3d 1158, 1174 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(“[C]onduct constitutes adverse employment action under [Title VII] when it results in a significant 
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”). 
 74. The Supreme Court has yet to define a standard for the purported adverse action 
requirement under Section 703(a)(1). 
 75. See, e.g., Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 76. See, e.g., Green v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 657 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(“Adverse employment actions include only ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, 
granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating.”).  For an in-depth discussion on the 
origins of the “ultimate employment decision” standard, see Lidge, supra note 67, at 358–66. 
 77. See White, supra note 34, at 1151–54.  Some circuits have considered that some actions, 
although not ultimate in nature, may still have a substantial impact on an employee if such actions 
are made in a discriminatory manner. See, e.g., Beyer v. Cty. of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 
2008) (requiring a dignity approach in which a discriminatory denial of transfer to materially more 
advantageous job is actionable); Grayson v. City of Chi., 317 F.3d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“Because [the plaintiff’s] position at the time of the hiring decisions was identical in all but title 
to the position he was denied, rejecting his application for promotion was not a materially adverse 
employment action.”).  However, the parsing of what constitutes a “materially adverse action” has 
added to the analytical confusion.  See Levinson, supra note 26, at 636. 
 78. 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & LAUREN M. WALTER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
AND PRACTICE 59 (4th ed., 2009). 
 79. See Levinson, supra note 26, at 636; Gertner, supra note 32, at 110 (“It is hard to imagine 
a higher bar or one less consistent with the legal standards developed after the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act, let alone with the way discrimination manifests itself in the twenty-first century.”). 
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burdens have, in operation, created a safe harbor for invidious discrimination.80  
As the case study below will show, this trend has whittled the protections of 
Title VII to an untenable point.  Accordingly, this discussion now turns to 
explore possible factors bearing on the judiciary that have led to this 
phenomenon. 
C. Factors on the Judiciary 
Legal scholars in federal anti-discrimination law agree that any discrimination 
based on a protected trait contradicts the word and spirit of Title VII.81  Yet, 
courts continue to chip away at the protections provided by the statute through 
an aggressively narrow reading of the language.82  Despite legislative 
intervention to counter the narrowing, the practice of increasing the plaintiff’s 
burden continues.83  Legal scholars have noted the problem and offered 
solutions.84  Similarly, members of the federal bench have acknowledged the 
alarming trend and offered insight into the cause of this phenomenon.85 
 Federal courts have, in some measure, interpreted Title VII “virtually, 
although not entirely, out of existence.”86  Indeed, studies show that employment 
                                                 
 80. See id. at 631–32 (“Indeed, many courts are sending a message to employers and their 
supervisors that they can discriminate with impunity, provided that their conduct does not reach a 
particularly egregious or materially adverse level.”). 
 81. See Chambers, supra note 34, at 1191 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s interpretations 
of Title VII in several cases contradict Title VII’s expansive view); Levinson, supra note 26, at 
632–37 (arguing that requirements of material adversity imposed by lower federal courts do not 
have any support in either Title VII’s language or in the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding Title 
VII); Lidge, supra note67, at 373–75 (arguing that requirements for “adverse, materially adverse, 
or ultimate” employment actions contradict the “breathtakingly simple” language of Title VII); 
White, supra note34, at 1191 (arguing that, at most, courts should consider the adversity of an 
employment action to infer an unlawful motive behind the action, but should ultimately find 
adversity “irrelevant” when they determine that there was an unlawful motive). 
 82. See McCormick, supra note 34, at 25–26 (noting that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has 
repeatedly criticized the Supreme Court for “parsimonious[ly]” interpreting Title VII and 
“warp[ing]” its meaning); Chambers, supra note 34, at 1165–66 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
decisions have enabled employers to structure their activities so as to technically avoid violating 
Title VII despite discriminating against their employees). 
 83. See McCormick, supra note 34, at 25–26 (describing the absurd cycle of Congress having 
to amend its anti-discrimination statutes in response to the federal courts’ inevitable attempts to 
narrow the statutes’ impact); Chambers, supra note 27, at 781–82; Widiss, supra note 27, at 536–
41 (attributing the lack of analytical clarity regarding Title VII to the tension resulting from the 
federal courts’ insistence on following precedents of which Congress has shown disapproval 
through various amendments of Title VII). 
 84. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 34, at 31 (calling for more judicial education); 
Chambers, supra note 27, at 781–82 (recommending careful legislative intervention that is 
cognizant of how the federal courts will react). 
 85. See, e.g., Gertner, supra note 32, at 116–23. 
 86. Nancy Gertner, The Judicial Repeal of the Johnson/Kennedy Administration’s 
“Signature” Achievement 1 (Mar. 9, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=24 
06671. 
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discrimination plaintiffs fare significantly worse in federal court than plaintiffs 
in any other substantive area of federal law.87  Scholars cite this phenomenon as 
evidence of judicial hostility toward employment discrimination plaintiffs.88  
Some members of the federal bench, however, attribute the plight of the 
employment discrimination plaintiff to unintended consequences of pre-trial 
procedural rulings.89  Others point to an ideology of conservatism against the 
anti-discrimination plaintiff as the reason for this phenomenon.90 
1. Judicial Hostility Toward the Anti-Discrimination Plaintiff 
Many scholars have interpreted the increasing burden imposed on anti-
discrimination plaintiffs by federal courts as a judicial hostility toward anti-
discrimination claims.91  Based on his four-decade career in employment 
discrimination litigation, Judge Mark W. Bennett acknowledges that “the federal 
judiciary has become increasingly unfriendly towards employment 
discrimination cases going to trial.”92  This unfriendliness or hostility is most 
evident at the appellate level where summary judgment dismissals are 
overwhelmingly affirmed and verdicts for the anti-discrimination plaintiff are 
reversed more frequently than any other substantive area of federal law.93 
2. The Consequences of “Only Procedural” Rulings 
Early rulings on procedural threshold issues—such as summary judgment—
can be outcome determinative, requiring a court to make substantive predictions 
about the merits of the case.94  Through these procedural rulings, “more and 
more courts are weighing evidence, evaluating the credibility of claims and 
witnesses, and substituting their normative judgments for a jury’s 
                                                 
 87. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in 
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 127 (2009). 
 88. See, e.g., Kerri Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination, 56 ST. LOUIS L.J. 
111, 112 (2011); Gertner, supra note 32, at 109 (“Federal courts, I believed, were hostile to 
discrimination cases.  Although the judges may have thought they were entirely unbiased, the 
outcomes of those cases told a different story.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1941 
(1998); see also Gertner, supra note 32, at 109 (“One judge after another insisted that there was no 
hostility.  All they were doing when they dismissed employment discrimination cases was 
following the law—nothing more, nothing less.”). 
 90. See Gertner, supra note 87, at 2–3. 
 91. See Stone, supra note 90, at 112. 
 92. Mark W. Bennett, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judgment” Days 
of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed 
Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 697 
(2013). 
 93. See Clermont, supra note 88, at 108–14. 
 94. Elizabeth M. Schneider & Nancy Gertner, “Only Procedural”: Thoughts on the 
Substantive Law Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 767, 768 (2012). 
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determination.”95  As a result, these “only procedural” determinations have 
effectively revised the substantive law “through the back door.”96 
Typically turning on nuances of intent, disparate treatment cases are factually 
complex.  Because few employers openly admit to acts of intentional 
discrimination, plaintiffs must prove intent with circumstantial evidence, which 
rarely stands uncontested.97  Nonetheless, the majority of employment 
discrimination cases end in summary judgment because trial courts improperly 
evaluate the merits of the case by weighing the credibility of the evidence.  As a 
result, employment discrimination defendants enjoy greater success with 
summary judgment in federal court than defendants in any other substantive area 
of federal law.98 
Judge Nancy Gertner describes this phenomenon as “Losers’ Rules,” 
suggesting that “asymmetrical decisionmaking” may be responsible for this 
trend.99  When a judge grants summary judgment, typically for the defendant, an 
opinion is written.100  When summary judgment is denied, on the other hand, the 
case simply proceeds to trial without a written opinion discussing why summary 
judgment was denied.101  She explains that over time, “[i]f case after case recites 
the facts that do not amount to discrimination, it is no surprise that the 
decisionmakers have a hard time envisioning the facts that may well comprise 
discrimination.”102 
3. Conservativism: The Anti-Discrimination Plaintiff Bias 
Although asymmetrical opinion writing provides one plausible reason for the 
anti-discrimination plaintiff’s plight in federal court, Judge Gertner notes that 
standing precedent “hardly compels” courts to continue this practice.103  She 
suggests that the phenomenon may also be ideologically driven by 
conservativism.104  Conservativism in the judiciary refers to a practice where 
cases are decided based on either a political philosophy or a judicial 
philosophy.105 
When a “conservative judge” is guided by a political philosophy, key policy 
issues before the court are decided in a manner consistent with the conservative 
                                                 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Gertner, supra note 32, at 113. 
 98. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 89, at 109–13, 131–32. 
 99. Gertner, supra note 32, at 110. 
 100. Id. at 113–15. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 115. 
 103. Id. at 113. 
 104. Id. at 112. 
 105. Michael Kinsley, What Is a Conservative Judge?, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2010), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/04/what-is-a-conservative-judge/38786/. 
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political agenda.106  Although both Democratic and Republican presidents have 
appointed judges likely to make decisions that are consistent with their political 
agendas,107 conservative appointments have been criticized as hostile to civil 
rights.  For example, as President Reagan filled an unprecedented number of 
vacancies on the federal bench with conservative appointments,108 critics 
accused the Reagan appointees of “chipping away at protections against race and 
sex discrimination . . . and turning the federal clock back to earlier policies.”109  
Decisions of politically conservative judges are informed by the belief that 
employment discrimination is over because society has evolved into a post-
                                                 
 106. Id. (asserting that such individuals are those “who will vote to overturn Roe v. Wade”). 
 107. See generally Graeme Browning, Reagan Molds the Federal Court in His Own Image, 71 
ABA J. 60 (1985) (comparing President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s appointments of Justices to 
the Supreme Court to the judicial appointments of President Reagan). 
 108. Id. at 61 (“The Constitution gives the president the power to make judicial appointments, 
conservative legal scholars say, so it is not only reasonable but expected that his choices will reflect 
his policies.”). 
 109. Id. at 60–61 (noting that despite the Reagan Administration’s claims that politically 
conservative judges were merely applying the law, the nomination and confirmation processes 
served to ensure the appointment of ideologically homogenous judges who were skeptical of 
governmental responses to past racial discrimination and fervent supporters of free-market 
economic theories).  In January of 2017, President Donald Trump fulfilled his campaign promise 
to fill the Supreme Court vacancy left by the passing of Justice Antonin Scalia with Neil Gorsuch, 
a staunch conservative justice.  In the wake of Justice Scalia’s death, Senate Republicans refused 
to hold hearings for any justice nominated under President Obama to prevent what “would have 
likely given the Court’s liberal wing its first five-justice majority since the Warren Court of the 
1960s.”  Matt Ford, Trump Nominates Neil Gorsuch for the U.S. Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC 
(Jan. 31, 2017, 8:50 PM), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/gorsu 
ch-trump-supreme-court/515232/.  Following the successful appointment of Neil Gorsuch to the 
Supreme Court, Republican leaders have aggressively sought to manipulate the judicial branch by 
filling vast numbers of vacancies on the federal bench with conservative judges.  See Carl Hulse, 
Trump and McConnell See a Way to Make Conservatives Happy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/us/politics/trump-mcconnell-judicial-nominees.html 
(“Stymied legislatively, President Trump and Senator Mitch McConnell are turning their attention 
to one way they can skirt Democratic roadblocks and mollify unhappy Republicans—by filling 
scores of federal court vacancies.”); see also Charlie Savage, Trump Is Rapidly Reshaping the 
Judiciary. Here’s How., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/us/politics/tru 
mp-judiciary-appeals-courts-conservatives.html (“Republicans are systematically filling appellate 
seats they held open during President Barack Obama’s final two years in office with a particularly 
conservative group of judges with life tenure.”). 
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racial,110 post-gender reality111 and that the market is bias free,112 despite 
substantial evidence to the contrary.113 
“Judicial conservativism,” on the other hand, refers to “a strong belief in the 
principle of stare decisis, or respect for precedent.”114  The inherent issue with 
this judicial philosophy arises when cases within a substantive area have 
inconsitent holdings.  For example, “[d]oes that mean that a conservative judge 
must rule in favor of upholding all of the liberal rulings of the 1960s and 1970s?  
Even though many of them overturned earlier precedent?”115 
Determining which conservativism guides the federal judiciary is of little 
consequence to the anti-discrimination plaintiff because evidence of bias against 
him remains.  Indeed, courts often trivialize—even outright ignore—evidence 
of explicit bias.116 
II. ORTIZ-DIAZ V. HUD: ESCAPING A STIFLING MATERIALITY STANDARD 
As discussed above, the analytical confusion in lower federal courts unjustly 
prevents an increasing number of disparate treatment cases from reaching trial 
by imposing heavier burdens on plaintiffs.  A recent case from the D.C. Circuit, 
                                                 
 110. Cf. Tanzina Vega, Working While Brown: What Discrimination Looks Like Now, CNN 
MONEY (Nov. 25, 2015, 12:04 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/11/25/news/economy/racial-
discrimination-work/index.html; Dedrick Muhammad, Racial Equality In and Out of the 
Workplace, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2013, 10:38 AM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/dedrick-muhammad/racial-equality-in-and-ou_b_3836508.html 
(offering an example of disparate treatment faced by Ecuadorian workers who were barred from 
eating lunch in the workroom). 
 111. Cf. Leach v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 128 F. Supp. 3d 146, 156–57 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(claiming sex discrimination under Title VII). 
 112. Schneider & Gertner, supra note 96, at 776. 
 113. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, 
“Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477 (2007) (arguing that 
antidiscrimination laws should account for the unconscious biases that lead to gender-based and 
racial disparities); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More 
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 
AM. ECON. REV. 991, 1006–07 (2004) (finding that employers uniformly discriminated against 
applicants with “African American sounding” names during the hiring process despite the 
applicants being equally qualified as applicants with “White” names); see also Julie Creswell & 
Tiffany Hsu, Women’s Whisper Network Raises Its Voice, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/04/business/sexual-harassment-whisper-network.html 
(reporting on how social media has enabled women to come together and discuss the instances of 
gender-based discrimination they have experienced in their workplaces); Rebecca Hiscott, White 
People Think One Black Person’s Success Proves Racism Is Over, HUFFINGTON POST (June 10, 
2014, 9:54 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/10/racism-success-study_n_5474 
419.html (“[R]ecent Supreme Court decisions made under the assumption that racial discrimination 
is a thing of the past suggest this view is already having potentially disastrous consequences.”). 
 114. Kinsley, supra note 109. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See, e.g., discussion infra Part II. 
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Ortiz-Diaz v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),117 
illustrates the plight of the disparate treatment plaintiff and the eagerness of the 
courts to narrow the scope of Title VII. 
The facts of the case involve the denial of a transfer request allegedly based 
on the plaintiff’s race and national origin.  Although the D.C. Circuit initially 
affirmed summary judgment for the defendant, the sharply divided panel 
vehemently disagreed on whether the Circuit’s materiality standard barred the 
court from recognizing the denial of the plaintiff’s transfer request as “materially 
adverse.”118  A year later—while the plaintiff sought review en banc—the 
original three-judge panel “decided sua sponte to reconsider the case and 
vacated its decision.”119  It is appropriate, then, to look at Ortiz-Diaz as a stark 
example of the injustice resulting from the analytical confusion in disparate 
treatment jurisprudence. 
A. Facts of the Case 
Samuel Ortiz-Diaz, a Hispanic man born in Puerto Rico, began his 
employment with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
Office of Inspector General (HUD OIG), as a criminal investigator in San Juan, 
Puerto Rico in 1998.120  In 2000, Ortiz-Diaz was reassigned to Hartford, 
Connecticut, to be closer to his wife with whom he lived in Albany, New 
York.121  In 2009, Ortiz-Diaz accepted a promotion to senior special agent in 
HUD OIG’s headquarters in Washington, D.C..  His wife, however, remained in 
Albany, where the couple maintained the home they owned.122 
At headquarters, Assistant Inspector General John McCarty, although not 
Ortiz-Diaz’s immediate supervisor, was the senior manager charged with 
making personnel decisions that directly affected him.123  For example, McCarty 
was the ultimate decision-maker regarding employee promotions and the 
approval or denial of transfer requests within HUD OIG.  In fact, McCarty had 
previously exercised his transfer authority over Ortiz-Diaz in 2005.124  Despite 
their protests, McCarty involuntarily transferred Ortiz-Diaz and an African 
American investigator to assist with Hurricane Katrina relief efforts in 
Mississippi, which was regarded as “a hardship assignment.”125  Notably, non-
                                                 
 117. Ortiz-Diaz v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 831 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2016), aff’g 75 
F. Supp. 3d 561 (D.D.C. 2014), vacated, 867 F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  Throughout this Note, the 
2016 decision by the D.C. Circuit will be labeled as Ortiz-Diaz I and the 2017 decision as Ortiz-
Diaz II. 
 118. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d at 494–500 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring & Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 119. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 71. 
 120. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d at 490. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 72. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Brief for Appellant at 7 n.4, Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 15-5008). 
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minority investigators who similarly protested were not forced to take the 
hardship assignment to Mississippi.126 
Working at headquarters placed Ortiz-Diaz in close proximity to McCarty, 
where he noticed that McCarty exhibited discriminatory attitudes toward 
minority employees.127  Specifically, McCarty made racially disparaging 
comments about Hispanics in the workplace such as, “Where is the hired help?” 
and called any individual who appeared to be Hispanic by the same name or by 
the names of other Hispanic employees, claiming that Hispanics “all look 
alike.”128  McCarty was also the subject of an inordinate number of 
discrimination complaints.129 
Based on McCarty’s discriminatory conduct and a suspicion that he harbored 
racial animus, Ortiz-Diaz grew concerned “that his career would suffer if he 
remained in close proximity to McCarty at headquarters.”130  He began seeking 
transfer opportunities to work in regions he believed better positioned him for 
advancement within HUD OIG.131  As a privilege of employment, HUD OIG 
offered a voluntary transfer program, whereby employees could request a 
transfer to duty stations of their choice for reasons other than specific staffing 
needs at no cost to the government.132  Although request approvals were not 
guaranteed, the program had a history of generously enabling non-minority 
employees to transfer between offices, with HUD OIG even creating new 
positions to facilitate those transfers in some instances.133 
After communicating with the Region 2 (New York) Special Agent in Charge 
Rene Febles, Ortiz-Diaz learned of important, high-profile work needing the 
attention of a capable agent in Albany.134  Febles invited Ortiz-Diaz to consider 
filling that position, telling him that although there were no regularly stationed 
investigators in the Albany office, “it would be acceptable for Ortiz-Diaz to 
work either from his Albany home or from the Department’s Albany office.”135  
Shortly thereafter, Ortiz-Diaz also learned of a vacancy announcement in 
Hartford, Connecticut.136  Hoping to enhance his promotion opportunities, Ortiz-
Diaz approached his immediate supervisors to request transfers to either Albany 
                                                 
 126. Ortiz-Diaz further alleged that while he was working in Mississippi, “he learned several 
investigators volunteered for the transfer there and his involuntary transfer was unnecessary.”  Id. 
 127. Id. at 6–7. 
 128. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 72. 
 129. Brief for Appellant, supra note 128, at 7. 
 130. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 72. 
 131. Id. at 72–73. 
 132. In fact, the HUD OIG policy mandated that the no cost transfer program be administered 
without regard to race, sex, color, national origin, age, or disability.  Ortiz-Diaz I, 831F.3d 488, 494 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 133. Litigation later revealed that “McCarty was involved in each of those decisions.”  Ortiz-
Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 73. 
 134. Brief for Appellant, supra note 128, at 8. 
 135. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 73. 
 136. Brief for Appellant, supra note 128, at 8. 
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or Hartford, but they advised him to make the requests with McCarty directly.  
McCarty, in turn, summarily denied both requests.137 
Notably, shortly before denying Ortiz-Diaz’s transfer request, McCarty 
approved the transfer request of a white female special agent from Hartford, 
Connecticut, to the Boston, Massachusetts, office because she planned to marry 
a Boston police officer.138  Rather than filling the vacant special agent position 
in Hartford with Ortiz-Diaz, McCarty filled the vacancy with another white 
female special agent notwithstanding the fact that her supervisor—an African 
American employee who had previously complained of McCarty’s racial 
animus—objected to the transfer.139 
Believing that his transfer requests were denied because of his race and 
national origin, Ortiz-Diaz filed a disparate treatment claim in federal district 
court.140  The government, with discovery disputes pending, moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that Ortiz-Diaz suffered no adverse employment 
action, and the district court agreed.141  Because Ortiz-Diaz never alleged a loss 
in “pay, supervisory responsibilities, or job opportunities as result of the 
[transfer] denials,” the court determined that the challenged action was based on 
the denial of “a purely lateral transfer,” which required a showing of a materially 
adverse consequence.142  Concluding that Ortiz-Diaz failed to offer anything 
“beyond his own speculation” that transfer would have bettered his career 
opportunities, the court found that Ortiz-Diaz could not survive the summary 
judgment challenge.143 
Despite Ortiz-Diaz’s unresolved “motion to compel ‘full and complete 
responses’ to his discovery requests relating to potential comparators,” the court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the government.144  Judge Royce 
Lamberth saw “no further need for discovery” because the information sought 
would not defeat summary judgment, positing that 
even if Mr. Ortiz-Diaz uncovered . . . evidence that all white 
employees were granted voluntary transfers while all non-white white 
employees were refused them, that discriminatory statements were 
rampant, that dozens of complaints had been lodged—it would not 
alter the conclusion that the denial of a lateral transfer was not an 
adverse employment decision.145 
                                                 
 137. Id. at 9. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Ortiz-Diaz v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 75 F. Supp. 3d 561, 563 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 141. The government moved for summary judgment shortly after Ortiz-Diaz filed a motion to 
compel discovery, but the district court postponed settling the discovery dispute until resolution of 
the dispositive motions.  Id. at 567–68. 
 142. Id. at 565. 
 143. Id. at 567. 
 144. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d 488, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 145. Ortiz-Diaz, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 568. 
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B. Ortiz-Diaz I: Immunizing Discrimination 
On appeal, D.C. Circuit Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson affirmed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment.146  Citing the “materially adverse” standard 
as the legal standard for adverse employment actions in the D.C. Circuit, Judge 
Henderson concluded that, despite undisputed evidence of racial animus, Ortiz-
Diaz failed to show that he suffered sufficient harm to warrant the resolution of 
his claim on the merits at trial.147 
Judge Henderson characterized Ortiz-Diaz’s claim of “material adversity” as 
a mere “dissatisfaction with the lack of reassignment,” adding that he offered 
only a “bare assertion” that his career opportunities were “tangibly injured” 
based on a “belief that his promotion outlook would look rosier” under a 
different supervisor.148  Ortiz-Diaz’s “dissatisfaction,” she reasoned, constituted 
only a subjective injury for which no legal remedy existed.149  She dismissed 
Ortiz-Diaz’s purported adversity as simply the loss of a “preference” not to work 
under a discriminatory supervisor and quipped, “If such a declaration were 
sufficient to raise a jury issue, our materiality requirement would be an empty 
vessel indeed.”150 
Curiously enough, however, Judge Henderson also filed a concurring opinion 
solely to take issue with “a disturbing hypothetical” posed in oral argument by 
Ortiz-Diaz’s counsel.151  Judge Henderson fervently rejected Counsel’s 
contention that, in accepting the government’s argument, the D.C. Circuit 
“would affirm dismissal of a suit challenging an employer’s affixing a ‘whites-
only’ sign to a water cooler because ‘not a penny is lost by any worker . . . no 
one lost supervisory duties . . . [and it is] not in any way related to the actual 
workplace.”152  She dismissed the argument entirely as bearing “no relevance” 
to the D.C. Circuit precedent for the “materially adverse” standard.153 
In a separate concurrence, Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh agreed with the 
affirmance of summary judgment for the government because, in his view, the 
majority opinion “faithfully” followed D.C. precedent that lateral transfers “are 
ordinarily not” adverse employment actions.154  Still, he filed a concurring 
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 149. Judge Henderson cites Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1130–31 (D.C. Cir. 2002), as 
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opinion because the injustice of dismissing Ortiz-Diaz’s claim did not sit well 
with him.  He explained: 
I write this concurrence simply to note my skepticism about those 
cases.  In my view, a forced lateral transfer—or the denial of a 
requested lateral transfer—on the basis of race is actionable under 
Title VII.  Based on our precedents, however, I join the majority 
opinion.155 
Circuit Judge Judith Rogers, on the other hand, held nothing back in her 
scathing dissent, proclaiming: “Once again the court returns to the issue of the 
proper role of the district court at summary judgment but this time stumbles 
badly.”156  After briefly noting that HUD OIG’s no cost, voluntary transfer 
program was a “privilege of Ortiz-Diaz’s employment,” she began her reproach 
of the majority’s affirmance by listing the evidence in the record.157 
Citing the Circuit’s decision in Stewart v. Ashcroft,158 Judge Rogers 
emphasized that material adversity could be satisfied by providing evidence that 
the challenged conduct curtailed the plaintiff’s future career opportunities.159  
She contended that Ortiz-Diaz cleared the material adversity hurdle because 
sufficient evidence in the record existed to meet this standard.160  Starting with 
Ortiz-Diaz’s sworn declaration that identified and explained the career 
opportunities he stood to gain by the approval of his transfer requests, she then 
turned to the evidence of McCarty’s more favorable treatment of white-
employee comparators.  After highlighting the corroborating accounts of 
McCarty’s racial animus in the workplace, she closed her review of the record 
by pointing to the list of discrimination complaints launched against McCarty.161 
In Judge Rogers’ view, the majority plainly misapplied the summary 
judgment standard when nothing in the adverse employment action 
jurisprudence supported otherwise.162  She concluded, “The court, although 
acknowledging that a ‘lateral transfer with increased promotion prospects might 
qualify’ as an adverse action, avoids this conclusion only by improperly 
discounting Ortiz-Diaz’s sworn declarations.”163  In the wake of Ortiz-Diaz I, an 
employer in the D.C. Circuit could openly base its decision to make or deny 
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lateral transfers on the employee’s race or national origin so long as the resulting 
injury remained sufficiently “subjective” to that employee. 
C. Ortiz-Diaz II: A Shot Across the Bow 
Following the affirmance of summary judgment, Ortiz-Diaz filed a petition 
for rehearing en banc on September 16, 2016.164  Eleven months later, “[b]efore 
that petition was resolved, the original three-judge court decided sua sponte to 
reconsider the case and vacated its decision.”165  Concluding that nothing in the 
D.C. Circuit’s Title VII precedent barred Ortiz-Diaz from proceeding to trial and 
that he provided sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment, the court 
reversed and remanded the case to the district court.166 
Writing the opinion for the court, Judge Rogers began her analysis by 
invoking the language of Title VII, calling attention to its primary objective to 
“achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have 
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other 
employees.”167  She then provided the historical context that led to the passage 
of Title VII: 
Title VII was enacted at a time when racially and ethnically biased 
supervisors left employees with two options: (1) quit their jobs, 
imperiling their ability to work and survive economically, or (2) 
endure the discrimination, and the attendant economic and 
professional toll it inflicted.  Congress created a third option by 
empowering employees to demand equal treatment . . . .168 
Thus, Ortiz-Diaz’s claim that he was discriminatorily denied transfer away from 
a racially and ethnically biased supervisor landed squarely “within Title VII’s 
heartland,” and nothing in the D.C. Circuit precedent held otherwise.169 
Noting that although the denial of a lateral transfer ordinarily does not 
constitute an adverse employment action under circuit precedent, the court made 
clear that “a showing of ‘consequences affecting . . . future employment 
opportunities’ could be sufficient” to meet the materiality standard,170 Judge 
Rogers found that the Circuit lacked precedent directly on point because, beyond 
the lateral transfer context, nothing in the Circuit’s precedent bore any 
resemblance to the “career-stifling transfer denials of which Ortiz-Diaz 
complained.”171 
                                                 
 164. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d 488 (No. 15-5008). 
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 167. Id. at 74 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)). 
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 170. Id. (quoting Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
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Given the particular facts of the case, Ortiz-Diaz’s “burden to show harm 
arising from diminished career prospects [was] necessarily rooted in 
probabilities.”172  In other words, the stronger the evidence of McCarty’s racial 
and ethnic bias, the higher the probability that remaining in headquarters with 
McCarty would have materially harmed his career.  Thus, the fundamental 
question was whether Ortiz-Diaz provided sufficient evidence to allow a 
reasonable juror to find that “transfer away from McCarty to Febles’ supervision 
would have improved his career prospects.”173 
Judge Rogers held that the district court committed a “fundamental error of 
law” when it discredited Ortiz-Diaz’s sworn declarations as “his own 
speculation” because the declarations provided “objective, non-conclusory 
statements of fact.”174  Citing several cases from the D.C. Circuit, Judge Rogers 
made clear that “the declarations alone provided sufficient competent evidence” 
to “render summary judgment inappropriate” in Ortiz-Diaz’s case.175 
Furthermore, the court found that Ortiz-Diaz’s proffered letter from a former 
co-worker alleging similar observations of McCarty’s racial and ethnic bias, 
coupled with the government’s acknowledgment of other discriminatory 
complaints lodged against McCarty, corroborated Ortiz-Diaz’s contention that 
McCarty fostered a discriminatory work environment.176  Thus, evidence 
showing that McCarty’s personnel decisions were rooted in racial and ethnic 
bias, by extension, strengthened the inference that the denials of transfer away 
from McCarty resulted in materially adverse consequences for Ortiz-Diaz.177 
Acknowledging that some evidence in the record cut against Ortiz-Diaz’s 
claim, Judge Rogers reminded the court that its “role at summary judgment is 
not to find facts in lieu of a jury, particularly not against the non-moving 
party.”178  Rather, the court is solely tasked with determining “whether sufficient 
evidence exists for a reasonable jury to find in Ortiz-Diaz’s favor, i.e., that 
McCarty did harbor such a bias.”179 
Concurring in the judgment, Judge Henderson agreed that a genuine issue of 
material fact existed for trial but took issue with the “unwise” approach of the 
majority.180  According to Judge Henderson, the critical question centered on 
whether HUD OIG’s no-cost transfer program constituted a legally protected 
                                                 
Cir. 2002), or a ‘subjective preference’ to work for Febles in Albany, Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 
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“privilege” of employment.181  Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Hishon 
v. King and Spalding, Judge Henderson acknowledged that the “terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment” clause of Title VII should be 
interpreted broadly.182  “It can apply to everything from a security clearance, to 
a bonus, to eligibility for election to a law firm’s partnership,” she added.183  
Therefore, “in light of the particular features of HUD’s no-cost transfer program 
and its potential to aid Ortiz-Diaz’s professional development,” she agreed that 
the case should proceed to trial.184 
Nonetheless, Judge Henderson remained deeply unsettled by the majority’s 
holding, charging that her colleagues “cherry-pick[ed] the factual record” to 
conclude that the denial of transfer away from McCarty was itself actionable 
under Title VII.185  Denouncing the majority’s review of the evidence, she 
criticized that “they reach[ed] back twelve years” to consider McCarty’s 
decision to impose the temporary hardship assignment to Mississippi, yet 
ignored the fact that it was McCarty who subsequently approved Ortiz-Diaz’s 
promotion to special agent.186  She also pointed out that “McCarty worked to 
find Ortiz-Diaz a different comparably attractive job” after awarding a position 
in New York for which Ortiz-Diaz applied to another Hispanic employee.187 
In Judge Henderson’s reading of the record, McCarty’s “discriminatory bent 
[wa]s, at most, slight.”188  She remained skeptical of the majority’s reliance on 
Ortiz-Diaz’s sworn declaration, arguing that the law surrounding the sufficiency 
of a sworn declaration at summary judgment was “hardly as clear as [the 
majority] suggest[ed].”189  Finding that “McCarty’s alleged bias was hardly self-
evident,” she concluded that she “would wait for a claim with more ‘objectively 
tangible harm’” before narrowing the precedent on lateral transfers.190 
Judge Rogers issued a concurring opinion to address the case’s 
unconventional procedural history.  Pleased with the court’s reversal, she 
acknowledged its significance and projected, “Perhaps our reconsideration will 
serve as a shot across the bow that courts in this Circuit must adhere to the 
summary judgment standard and not prematurely reject evidence that a jury 
could reasonably credit.”191  Admittedly doubtful that such a result would occur, 
she added, “[O]ne can only marvel at Ortiz-Diaz’s escape from our otherwise 
                                                 
 181. Id. at 78–79 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 182. Id. at 79 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 
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stifling materiality standard . . . . I fear that the next plaintiff, alleging a similar 
wrong, may not be as fortunate.”192  She concluded with a call for a definitive 
solution to the injustice: 
Therefore, it remains long past time for the en banc court to join its 
sister circuits to make clear that transfers denied because of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin are barred under Title VII . . . and that 
any action by an employer to deny an employment benefit on such 
grounds is an adverse employment action under Title VII.193 
Judge Kavanaugh issued a concurring opinion to join Judge Roger’s call to 
action.194  Referencing the uncertainty surrounding “the line separating transfers 
actionable under Title VII from those that are not,” he urged the en banc court 
to definitively establish that all discriminatory transfers, or denial of requests for 
transfer, constitute adverse employment actions under Title VII.195  In his view, 
such conduct “plainly constitutes discrimination with respect to ‘compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ in violation of Title VII.”196 
III. AN ANALYTICAL NIGHTMARE LEADS TO AN UNJUST REALITY 
Ortiz-Diaz I illustrates, as many legal scholars argue, how today’s disparate 
treatment jurisprudence diametrically opposes both the letter and spirit of Title 
VII.  The D.C. Circuit initially denied Ortiz-Diaz a judicial remedy and 
effectively left McCarty free to maintain “a policy that, notwithstanding a 
concrete opportunity for professional advancement, no Hispanics need apply for 
the no-cost transfer program” at HUD OIG.197  Judge Rogers highlights this 
anomaly in her admonishment of the majority opinion, deriding, “Yet no court 
could condone that result.”198  How, then, do federal courts reconcile this 
paradox? 
To answer this question, we must first examine Title VII’s requirement of an 
adverse employment action.  The statute is completely void of such language.199  
Lower federal courts point to the “terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment” clause of Section 703(a)(1) as the authority for the adverse 
employment action requirement.200  However, in Hishon, the Supreme Court 
interpreted that language as an expansive concept, encompassing any benefits 
                                                 
 192. Id. at 80–81 (Rogers, J., concurring). 
 193. Id. at 81 (Rogers, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). 
 194. Id. at 81 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 195. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 196. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 197. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d 488, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 198. Id. at 498 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 199. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
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 200. See discussion supra Section I.B.2. 
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that result from an employment relationship.  The Court explicitly instructed, “A 
benefit that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled 
out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free under the 
employment contract simply not to provide the benefit at all.”201 
It is no coincidence that Judge Rogers’ dissent in Ortiz-Diaz I cited Hishon 
when she reminded the court that “[the no-cost transfer] program was a privilege 
of Ortiz-Diaz’s employment.”202  Likewise, Judge Henderson found—albeit 
only upon reconsideration in Ortiz-Diaz II—that the no-cost transfer program 
“could qualify as a ‘privilege’ of [Ortiz-Diaz’s] employment [under Hishon], 
raising a genuine issue of fact for jury resolution.”203  So, if both Judge Rogers 
and Judge Henderson agree that the denial of an employment privilege amounts 
to an adverse employment action, then what explains all “[t]he ink that has been 
spilled over the course of [Ortiz-Diaz’s] appeal”?204 
The lower courts imported the adverse employment action into the “terms, 
conditions, or privileges” clause, in large part, out of a desire for judicial 
economy.205  Indeed, proponents of the adverse employment action argue that 
without a sustainability threshold, discrimination claims based on “every 
workplace slight” would overwhelm the courts.206  Even accepting that the 
adverse employment action may be necessary, setting the bar at “materially 
adverse” results in manifestly unjust consequences.207  As evidenced by Ortiz-
Diaz I, the D.C. Circuit “so finely parsed” the adverse employment action 
requirement “that two judges initially concluded [the materially adverse action 
precedent] barred [Ortiz-Diaz] from a judicial remedy.”208 
The panel relied heavily on Stewart v. Ashcroft,209 which clarified Brown v. 
Brody,210 the D.C. Circuit’s seminal case on lateral transfers, in both Ortiz-Diaz 
I and Ortiz-Diaz II to reach opposite conclusions.  In Brown, the D.C. Circuit 
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 202. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d at 494 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 203. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Henderson, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 204. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 80 (Rogers, J., concurring). 
 205. See Russell v. Principi, 257 F.3d 815, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Rogers, J.) (“[N]ot everything 
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 207. See, e.g., Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d 488, 491 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Henderson, J.) (“Under our 
Circuit precedent the action complained of must be ‘materially adverse’ to support a discrimination 
claim.” (citing Ginger v. District of Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2008))). 
 208. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 80 (Rogers, J., concurring). 
 209. 352 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 210. 199 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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defined lateral transfers as “one in which [the plaintiff] suffers no diminution in 
pay or benefits,” holding that neither the involuntary imposition nor denial of a 
lateral transfer amounted to an adverse employment action unless “some other 
materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
[the plaintiff’s] employment or her future employment opportunities [existed,] 
such that a trier of fact could conclude that the plaintiff has suffered objectively 
tangible harm.”211 
Four years after Brown, the D.C. Circuit revisited the issue of lateral transfers 
in the context of Title VII in Stewart v. Ashcroft.212  In Stewart, the plaintiff, 
who worked as Senior Litigation Counsel for the Department of Justice, filed a 
disparate treatment action against his employer after “two separate incidents in 
which white candidates were selected over him” to serve as Chief.213  The district 
court determined that Stewart’s non-selections amounted to denials of lateral 
transfer, rather than non-promotion, because transitioning from Senior Litigator 
to Chief amounted to no difference in pay or benefits.214  Accordingly, to make 
a prima facie under Brown, the court required that Stewart show a “tangible 
employment action evidenced by firing, failing to promote, a considerable 
change in benefits, or a reassignment with significantly different 
responsibilities.”215  Finding Stewart’s desire to become Chief as “mere 
idiosyncrasies of personal preference,” the district court determined that Stewart 
suffered no material consequences and granted summary judgement for the 
government.216 
On appeal, the circuit court agreed that Stewart’s non-selection amounted to 
the denial of a lateral transfer and was therefore subject to the holding in 
Brown.217  Analyzing the facts under the framework of Brown, the circuit court 
emphasized that “[t]he remaining language of Brown suggests that there are 
lateral transfers that could be considered adverse employment actions.”218  In the 
court’s view, transitioning from Senior Litigation Counsel to Chief meant an 
advancement within the hierarchy of the organization, notwithstanding the fact 
that pay and benefits remained the same.  Thus, denying Stewart such an 
opportunity for advancement resulted in “‘materially adverse consequences [for] 
the terms, conditions, or privileges’ of [his] employment.”219 
Like the plaintiff in Stewart, the denial of Ortiz-Diaz’s transfer requests 
resulted in the denial of opportunities for advancement.  Indeed, Ortiz-Diaz 
provided objective statements—which the government never disputed—about 
                                                 
 211. Id. at 457. 
 212. Stewart, 352 F.3d at 423–24. 
 213. Id. at 423. 
 214. Id. at 426. 
 215. Stewart v. Ashcroft, 211 F. Supp. 2d 166, 173 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 216. Id. at 175–76 (quoting Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
 217. Stewart, 352 F.3d at 426. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 426–27. 
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the professional benefits he expected to gain had his transfer requests not been 
denied.220  In Ortiz-Diaz I, no one disputed that Stewart controlled or that Ortiz-
Diaz attributed his transfer requests to increased promotion prospects.  Yet, the 
case resulted in a majority opinion that found no adverse employment action, 
two concurring opinions, and a dissent. 
Ortiz-Diaz I chose the path of most resistance to determine that no material 
adversity existed.  Perhaps this is a manifestation of Gertner’s Losers’ Rules 
theory, where an abundance of case law detailing what material adversity is not 
has left the majority hard-pressed to envision a set of facts that do meet the 
“materially adverse” standard.221  After all, Judge Henderson made an elaborate 
effort to discuss all the ways that lateral transfers fail to meet the materiality 
standard under D.C. Circuit precedent.222  Despite his “skepticism” of the result, 
Judge Kavanaugh joined in the majority opinion solely “because it faithfully 
follow[ed] [D.C. Circuit] precedents.”223 
Granted, the “asymmetric decisionmaking” of the Losers’ Rules theory may 
be a contributing factor that led to the analytical confusion in Ortiz-Diaz I.224  
But, as Judge Rogers pointed out in Ortiz-Diaz II, nothing in the Circuit’s lateral 
transfer precedent bore any “resemblance to the adversity Ortiz-Diaz faced” by 
remaining under the thumb of McCarty’s alleged racial animus.225  Thus, 
perhaps an ideology rooted in conservativism also contributed to the unfortunate 
results in Ortiz-Diaz I. 
Indeed, Judge Kavanaugh’s principled belief in stare decisis compelled him 
to compromise his personal objections to racially oppressive conduct in the 
workplace.226  Noting his skepticism, he proceeded to deprive Ortiz-Diaz of a 
judicial remedy due to case law that regards lateral transfers as “ordinarily not 
changes in the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of employment.”227  In 
concurring with the majority, Judge Kavanaugh woefully conflated “are 
ordinarily not” with “are never.” 
                                                 
 220. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d 488, 496–97 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“Ortiz-Diaz 
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that he would be better positioned to advance within the Inspector General’s Office.”). 
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 226. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d at 494 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“In my view, a forced lateral 
transfer—or the denial of a requested lateral transfer—on the basis of race is actionable under Title 
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 227. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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Or perhaps Ortiz-Diaz I was guided by the conservative belief that 
employment discrimination is over, that society has evolved into a post-racial, 
post-gender reality and that the market is bias-free.228  Indeed, throughout both 
her majority opinion in Ortiz-Diaz I and her concurrence in Ortiz-Diaz II, Judge 
Henderson makes no attempt to hide her skepticism of McCarty’s racial bias.  
Although she accuses the majority in Ortiz-Diaz II of “cherry-pick[ing] the 
factual record,” she reads the record in such a way that allows her to conclude 
that McCarty’s “discriminatory bent is, at most, slight.”229  She comes to this 
conclusion despite the government’s acknowledgment that McCarty had been 
the subject of an inordinate number of discrimination complaints and despite a 
letter by another HUD OIG employee that corroborated the accounts of 
McCarty’s discriminatory conduct. 
Instead, she mocks the majority for “reach[ing] back twelve years” to credit 
McCarty’s decision to impose the hardship assignment to Mississippi on Ortiz-
Diaz.  She also discredited the allegation of McCarty’s racial bias by 
emphasizing that it was McCarty who approved Ortiz-Diaz’s promotion to 
headquarters.  Moreover, the evidence revealed that McCarty had awarded the 
position in New York “to another employee—who, again, was Hispanic.”  Thus, 
in Judge Henderson’s view, “McCarty’s alleged bias was hardly self-evident.”  
However, her reproach of the majority’s analysis in Ortiz-Diaz II makes no 
mention of the white comparators who McCarty permitted to use the no-transfer 
program freely. 
No matter how you slice it, both Ortiz-Diaz I and Ortiz-Diaz II substantiate 
the claim of judicial hostility toward the anti-discrimination plaintiff in federal 
court.  Ultimately, the reasoning behind the hostility is irrelevant when the 
resulting injustice is undeniable.  Although Ortiz-Diaz managed to escape the 
“otherwise stifling materiality standard,” the next anti-discrimination plaintiff 
“may not be as fortunate.”230 
Without resolving this paradox, fundamental principles of equality and justice 
will exist only in theory as federal courts continue to increase the burdens on 
anti-discrimination plaintiffs.  Once again, government-sanctioned oppression 
will be the reality in this country as the courts effectively broaden the scope of 
permissible discrimination.  This bar to justice contradicts both the plain 
language of Title VII and Supreme Court precedent.  Therefore, the D.C. Circuit 
should resolve this paradox by heeding Judge Rogers’ advice and joining its 
sister circuits in holding that: (1) transfers denied on any impermissible basis are 
barred under Title VII, and (2) the denial of any employment benefit on 
impermissible grounds is an adverse employment action under Title VII. 
                                                 
 228. See Schneider & Gertner, supra note 95, at 776. 
 229. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 79 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment) 
 230. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 80–81 (Rogers, J., concurring).  On remand to district court, the 
parties reached a settlement agreement and dismissed the case.  Order Adopting Stipulation of 
Dismissal at 1, Ortiz-Diaz v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 1:12-cv-00726-RCL (D.D.C. 
Apr. 11, 2018), ECF No. 40. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
What set out to be the “embodiment of this Nation’s basic posture of common 
sense and common justice”231 has been reduced to a hollow vessel that 
immunizes discriminatory conduct in the workplace.  The existence of this trend 
has been well documented for decades, yet federal courts continue to whittle 
away the protections designed to safeguard equality and justice.  Regardless of 
whether it is ideologically driven by conservativism or merely the by-product of 
advances in judicial economy, the resulting injustice is undeniable. 
The inconsistency in disparate treatment jurisprudence among the federal 
circuits has yielded an analytical confusion that acts as a court-sanctioned barrier 
to equal employment opportunity in this country.  The Supreme Court should 
seek the opportunity to restore the aims of the Civil Rights Act by making it 
clear that impermissible motivation alone will render the denials of any 
employment benefits or lateral transfers as actionable under Title VII.  In the 
words of a legislator who helped pass the Civil Rights Act, “[W]e should insist 
that this law be a reality, and not merely something on the statute books which 
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